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Abstract 
This paper utilizes panel unit root, panel cointegration, and panel Granger causality test 
techniques to examine the inter-temporal relationship between government revenues and 
government expenditures in a panel of 15 OECD countries over the period 1992–2006. 
We find evidence of bidirectional causality between government revenues and govern-
ment expenditures, supporting the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. The findings of this 
paper have important implications for fiscal policy decision-making in these 15 OECD 
countries after the signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on February 7, 1992. 
1. Introduction 
Understanding the relationship between government spending and taxation 
is important in evaluating the government’s role in the distribution of resources. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the inter-temporal relationship between gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures for a panel of 15 OECD countries over 1992– 
–2006. 
In the literature, the discussion of the causal link between government reve-
nues and expenditures has resulted in several hypotheses. 1. The tax-and-spend hypo-
thesis suggests that changes in revenues induce changes in expenditures. 2. The spend- 
-and-tax hypothesis suggests the opposite in that changes in expenditures induce 
changes in revenues. 3. The fiscal synchronization hypothesis argues that revenues 
and  expenditures  decisions  are  made  jointly.  4. Another  view  relates  to  the insti-
tutional  separation of  the expenditure  and taxation decisions  of government.  This 
perspective suggests that government revenues and expenditures are independent of 
each other. 
This paper intends to examine the relationship between government revenues 
and expenditures in a panel of 15 OECD countries. Tests on panel data are distinct in 
that they convey more information on the government revenue-expenditure relation 
through an increased number of observations from adding individual time series. 
Panel unit root and panel cointegration techniques are first applied to establish 
the long-run relation between government revenues and expenditures, and then panel 
error-correction models are employed to test the four hypotheses proposed in the lit-
erature. The results from our panel error-correction model indicate that a feedback 
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(bidirectional causality) exists between government revenues and expenditures, sup-
porting the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the hypo-
theses and previous research. Section 3 discusses the methodology and data used in 
our  study.  Section 4 provides  empirical  results, while  Section 5 offers  some  con-
clusions. 
2. Hypotheses and Previous Research 
Several hypotheses have been proposed to describe the inter-temporal rela-
tionship  between  government  revenues  and  expenditures.  First,  the tax-and-spend 
hypothesis advanced by Friedman (1978) contends that changes in government reve-
nues lead to changes in government expenditures. Friedman infers that tax increases 
will only lead to expenditure increases, resulting in an inability to reduce budget de-
ficits. Curiously, Buchanan and Wagner (1978) argue for the opposite relationship: 
that decreased revenues lead to increased spending as consumers demand more pro-
grams. Empirically, this hypothesis is characterized by unidirectional causality run-
ning from government revenues to government expenditures. 
Second, the spend-and-tax hypothesis proposes that changes in government 
expenditures lead to changes in government revenues. Peacock and Wiseman (1961) 
advocate that temporary increases in government expenditures due to economic and 
political crises can lead to permanent increases in government revenues from taxa-
tion,  often  called  the “displacement  effect.”  Empirically,  the spend-and-tax  hypo-
thesis is characterized by unidirectional causality running from government spending 
to government taxes. 
Third, Musgrave (1966) as well as Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest that 
voters compare the marginal benefits and marginal costs of government services when 
formulating a decision in terms of the appropriate levels of government revenues and 
government expenditures. Thus, revenue and expenditure decisions are jointly deter-
mined under this fiscal synchronization hypothesis. Empirically, this hypothesis is 
characterized by contemporaneous feedback or bidirectional causality between govern-
ment revenues and government expenditures. 
A fourth hypothesis stated by Baghestani and McNown (1994) relates to the in-
stitutional separation of the expenditure and taxation decisions of government. This 
perspective suggests that revenues and expenditures are independent of each other. 
Empirically, this hypothesis is characterized by non-causality between government 
revenues and government expenditures. 
Although the tax-and-spend, spend-and-tax, fiscal synchronization, and insti-
tutional separation hypotheses are easy to distinguish from one another, different 
studies on the same country result in different conclusions. The results from these 
empirical studies are sensitive to the sample period under examination, the degree of 
temporal aggregation, the inclusion of macroeconomic controls, and the choice of 
econometric methodology. In the case of the United States, Blackley (1986), Ram 
(1988), and Hoover and Sheffrin (1992) provide evidence to support the tax-and- 
-spend hypothesis, while Anderson et al. (1986), Furstenberg et al. (1986), Jones 
and Joulfaian (1991), and Ross and Payne (1998) find support for the spend-and-  
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-tax hypothesis. Manage and Marlow (1986), Miller and Russek (1990), and Ow-
oye (1995)  suggest  the fiscal  synchronization hypothesis  is valid  for  the United 
States, while Baghestani and McNown (1994) support the institutional separation 
hypothesis. 
In a study of OECD countries, Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1991) find support 
for the tax-and-spend hypothesis in Italy and Canada; support for the spend-and-tax 
hypothesis in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Aus-
tria, Finland, and Greece; and support for the fiscal synchronization hypothesis in 
Ireland. 
In our paper, we apply the panel data approach to investigate possible changes 
in the behavior of fiscal authorities related to the signing of the EU Treaty in Maas-
tricht on February 7, 1992, with the setting up of the fiscal convergence criteria that 
urged the EU countries to consolidate public finances in the run-up to the EMU on 
January 1, 1999, when most EU legacy currencies were replaced by the euro, and in 
the context of the SGP since then. The following section will elaborate on the meth-
odology to be used in this study along with a description of the data. 
3. Methodology and Data 
The countries used in this study are as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Demark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland,  the United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States.  The annual data  are  ob-
tained  from  the OECD.Stat  online  database.  General  government  revenues  (Rev), 
general government expenditures (Exp), and GDP at constant prices (deflated at 2000 
market prices) are collected over the period of 1992–2006. 
Our econometric methodology proceeds in three stages. First, we implement 
the Fisher PP panel unit root test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) to ascertain 
the order of integration of the three variables. Second, conditional on finding that 
these variables are integrated of order one we test for panel cointegration using the ap-
proach  suggested by Kao (1999).  Third, we  test for Granger  causality  between 
government revenues and government expenditures. 
3.1. Fisher Phillips-Perron Panel Unit Root Tests 
The Fisher Phillips-Perron (PP) test was proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) 
and Choi (2001). In contrast to the IPS test, which is a parametric and asymptotic 
test, the PP test is a nonparametric and exact test. If we define  i S  as the p-value from 
any individual unit root test for a cross-section, then under the null of a unit root for 
all cross-sections, we have the asymptotic result that  













 o ¦                                   (1) 
Here, we define 
1 )
  as the inverse of the standard normal cumulative dis-
tribution function. The Monte-Carlo studies of Maddala and Wu (1999) show that 
the Fisher PP test has a higher power than the IPS test.  
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3.2. Kao (Engle-Granger Based) Cointegration Tests 
Once the existence of a panel unit root has been established, the issue arises 
whether there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables under study. 
Given that each variable is integrated of order one, we test for panel cointegration 
using Kao’s (1999) tests. Consider the following system of cointegrated regressions: 
                                            it i it it yx u DE                                                 (2) 
where  1, , , 1, , iN tT       
                                                1 it it it xx H                                                      (3) 
where  i D  are individual constant terms,  E  is the slope parameter,  it u  are stationary 
disturbance terms, and finally, by construction,  it y  and  it x  are integrated processes 
of order one for all i .
1  
The zero mean innovation vector  (, ) it it it wu H    satisfies 
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where  > @ Tr  denotes the largest integer <=  Tr  and  () i B : is a vector Brownian mo-
tion with asymptotic covariance: . 
Under  the assumptions  that  the process  it w  i s  i ndependent  across  i ,  i.e., 
() 0 it js Eww c    for all ij z  and for all t, s, that  it x  are not cointegrated, i.e.,  22 : is non- 
-singular, and using Phillips and Moon’s (1999) sequential limit theory, in which 
T of first followed  by  N of, Kao (1999) derives two types of panel coin-
tegration tests. The first is a Dickey-Fuller (DF) type test and the second is an Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) type test. Both tests can be calculated from: 
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where the residuals  ˆit u  are obtained from Equation (2). The following specification 
of null and alternative hypotheses is used: 
                                          0 :1 , :1 A HH U U                                               (6) 
Kao (1999) proposes four DF-type statistics. The first two DF statistics are 
based on assuming strict exogeneity of the regressors with respect to the errors in 
the equation,  while  the remaining  two  allow  for  endogeneity  of  the regressors.  In 
addition, Kao (1999) proposes an ADF test statistic. Finally the DF statistics, which 
allow for endogeneity, and the ADF statistic involve deriving some nuisance para-
meters from the long-run conditional variances  : . The asymptotic distributions of 
all tests converge to a standard normal distribution  (0,1) as and NT N of of.  
Based  on  Gutierrez’s  paper  (2003),  Kao’s  panel  tests  have  higher  (lower) 
power  than  Pedroni’s  tests  when  a small-T  (high-T)  number  of  observations  are 
included in a homogeneous panel.  
1 Indeed, more regressors can be included in Eq. (2) as well as trend variables.  
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3.3. Panel Granger Causality Tests 
Given that the series under investigation are cointegrated, Equations (7) and 
(8) were estimated using a panel-based vector error-correction model (VECM) with 
a dynamic  error  correction  term  based  on  Holtz-Eakin  et  al.  (1989).  The main 
purpose  of  the exercise  is  to  establish  the causal  linkages  between  government 
revenues (Rev) and government expenditures (Exp) with GDP as a control variable.
2 
This means that the traditional panel VAR model is augmented with a one period 
lagged  error  correction  term,  which  is  obtained  from  the cointegrated  model. 
The panel Granger causality test will be based on the following equations:  
11 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 ǻRe ǻRe ǻǻ it g ip it p ip it p ip it p i it
pp p
vv Exp GDP ECT SS S S \         ¦¦¦         (7) 
22 1 2 2 2 3 2 1 ǻǻ ǻ Re ǻ it g ip it p ip it p ip it p i it
pp p
Exp Exp v GDP ECT SS S S \        ¦¦ ¦        (8) 
Here,  it ECT
3 are the estimated residuals  it H  (the error correction term) from 
the long-run model in Equation (2),  , ii i t ECT \  reflect the long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship among the variables, ǻ denotes the first difference operator, and p denotes 
the lag length selected. From the system, the panel Granger-causality tests are exam-
ined by testing whether all the coefficients of  ǻ it p Exp   or  ǻRe it p v   are statistically 
different from zero as a group based on a standard F-test and/or the  , ii \  coefficient of 
the error correction is also significant (denoting long-run causation). Since the Gran-
ger-causality tests are very sensitive to the lag length selection, in this paper the lag 
lengths are determined using Hsiao’s (1979) sequential procedure, which is based on 
the Granger definition of causality and Akaike’s (1974) minimum final prediction 
error  (FPE)  criterion.  This  procedure  is  known  as  the stepwise  Granger-causality 
technique, which provides a statistical criterion for choosing the optimum lag length 
using past information. Thornton and Batten (1985) have found Hsiao’s method to be 
superior to both arbitrary lag length selection and several systematic procedures for 
determining lag length. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Result of Fisher PP Panel Unit Root Tests 
Summary  statistics  for  government  revenues,  expenditures,  and  GDP  for 
the 15 OECD countries in our sample over the period 1992–2006 are not reported 
here (due to space constraints) but are available upon request. 
2 We include GDP as a control variable in the model like Anderson et al. (1986), von Furstenberg et al.
(1986), Baghestani and McNown (1994), and Ross and Payne (1998). This approach allows us to dis-
tinguish between the direct causality relation between revenues and expenditures and the indirect causality 
effects via GDP. The majority of the other papers that employ a bivariate framework will suffer from 
the ever-present  econometric  problem  of  the third  missing variable  (Granger  and  Newbold,  1986),  re-
sulting in potentially inaccurate results and conclusions. 
3
it ECT  in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) are the estimated residuals from Eq. (2), where 
11 1 1 2 Re it i i it i it it vE x p GDP D EE H     and  22 1 2 2 Re it i i it i it it Exp v GDP D EEH     .  
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A three-stage procedure was followed to test the direction of the causality. In 
the first stage the order of integration was tested using the Fisher PP panel unit root 
test. Table 1 shows the results of the panel unit root tests. The Fisher PP statistics for 
the levels of government revenues, government expenditures, and GDP do not reject 
the null hypothesis of a unit root. However, when we take the first difference of each 
of the variables, the Fisher PP statistics are higher than their respective critical values 
at the 1% level. Therefore, we conclude that [Re , , ] it it it vE x pGDP  are each integrated 
of order one or I(1). In the next stage, we will test whether there is a long-run equilib-
rium relationship among these three variables. 
4.2 Result of Kao’s Cointegration Tests 
The second stage involves testing for the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among government revenues, government expenditures, and GDP within 
a trivariate framework. Based on Kao’s (1999) ADF test statistics reported in Ta-
ble 2, we find that government revenues, government expenditures, and GDP are co-
integrated within the panel of these 15 OECD countries at a lag length of 2. 
4.3 Result of Panel Granger Causality Tests 
The existence of a cointegrating relationship suggests that there must be Gran-
ger causality in at least one direction. Table 3 examines short-run, long-run, and joint 
Granger causality within the panel-based vector error-correction model. The F-statistics 
on the independent variables in each of the two equations (7 and 8) indicate statistical 
significance of the short-run, long-run, and joint causal effects at the 1% level. This 
finding  supports  the fiscal  synchronization  hypothesis,  which  argues  that  revenue  
and expenditure decisions are made jointly. The results show that there is bidirection-
al  Granger  causality  between  government  revenues  and  government e xpenditures 
during the period of 1992–2006 under study. The findings of this paper have im-
portant implications for fiscal policy decision-making in these OECD countries after 
the signing of the EU Treaty in Maastricht on February 7, 1992. This outcome sug-
gests that fiscal policymakers in these 15 OECD countries do not make spending (tax) 
Table 1  Results of Fisher PP Panel Unit Root Tests
General Government  
Revenue 
General Government  
Expenditure  GDP
No trend  Trend  No trend  Trend  No trend  Trend 
 Revit 4.9855  2.2850   Expit 6.3657  -0.7805   GDPit 8.4222  -1.5949 








(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Note : *** and ** reject H0: Unit Root at 1% and 5% level of significance.
Table 2  Result of Kao's Residual Cointegration Test
   t-Statistic  Prob. 
ADF  -15.9829
*** ( 0 . 0 0 0 0 )  
Note: *** and ** reject H0: No Cointegration at 1% and 5% level of significance.  
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decisions  in  isolation  from  tax  (spending)  decisions.  The joint d etermination  of 
revenues and expenditures is appealing as long as it effectively restrains the budget 
deficit. This means that efforts to enhance sources of revenue should be accompanied 
by reductions in spending for those OECD countries with budget deficits. 
5. Conclusions 
Using a three-stage procedure, comprising the Fisher PP panel unit root test, 
the Kao cointegration test, and the panel Granger causality test, we find a bidirection-
al causal relation between government revenues and government expenditures, which 
lends support to the fiscal synchronization hypothesis in these OECD countries over 
1992–2006. This outcome suggests that fiscal policymakers in these 15 OECD coun-
tries should set revenues and expenditures simultaneously. Countries with budget 
deficits should raise revenues and cut spending simultaneously in order to control 
their budget deficits.  
 
REFERENCES  
Akaike H (1974): A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification. IEEE Transaction on Auto-
matic Control, AC-19, 716–723. 
Anderson W, Wallace MS, Warner JT (1986): Government spending and taxation: what causes 
what? Southern Economic Journal, 630–39. 
Baghestani H, McNown R (1994): Do revenues or expenditures respond to budgetary disequilibria? 
Southern Economic Journal, 311–22. 
Blackley  PR  (1986):  Causality  between  revenues  and  expenditures a nd  the  size  of  the  federal 
budget. Public Finance Quarterly, 139–56. 
Buchanan J, Wagner R (1978): Dialogues concerning fiscal religion, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 4:627–36. 
Choi I (2001): Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. Journal of International Money and Finance, 20: 
249–272. 
Friedman M (1978): The limitations of tax limitation. Policy Review, 7–14. 
Furstenberg GM von, Green RJ, Jeong J-H (1986): Tax and spend, or spend and tax? Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 179–88. 
Granger  CW,  Newbold  P  (1986):  Forecasting  economic  time  series.  2
nd E d .  A c a demic  Press, 
Orlando, FL. 
Gutierrez  L  (2003):  On  the  power  of  panel  cointegration  tests:  a  Monte  Carlo  comparison. 
Economics Letters, 80:105–11. 
Table 3  Results for Panel Causality Tests (Wald Tests
Source of Causation (Independent Variables) 
Short Run  Long Run  Joint (Short Run and Long Run)  Dependent 
Variable 

















(0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Note : X
2-statistics (p-value) are given in the table and *** stands for 1% level significance. 
172                                    Finance a úvČr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 2 
Holtz-Eakin D, Newey W, Rosen H (1989): The Revenues-expenditure Nexus: Evidence from Local 
Government Data. International Economic Review, 30:415–429.  
Hoover KD, Sheffrin, SM (1992): Causation, Spending, and Taxes: Sand in the Sandbox or Tax 
Collector for the Welfare State? American Economic Review, 82(1):225–48. 
Hsiao C (1979): Causality Tests in Econometrics. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
1(4):321–346. 
Jones JD, Joulfaian D (1991): Federal government expenditures and revenues in the early years of 
the American republic: evidence from 1792 to 1860. Journal of Macroeconomics, 13:133–55. 
Joulfaian D, Mookerjee R (1991): Dynamics of Government Revenues and Expenditures in Indus-
trial Economies. Applied Economics, 23(12):1839–44. 
Kao C (1999): Spurious regression and residual-based tests for cointegration in panel data. Journal 
of Econometrics, 90:1–44. 
Maddala GS, Wu S (1999): A comparative study of unit root tests with panel data and a new simple 
test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61:631–52. 
Manage  N,  Marlow  ML  (1986):  The  causal  relation  between  federal e xpenditures  and  receipts. 
Southern Economic Journal, 617–29. 
Meltzer A, Richard S (1981): A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political 
Economy, 89:914–27. 
Miller SM, Russek FS (1990): Co-integration and error correction models: temporal causality be-
tween government taxes and spending. Southern Economic Journal, 57:33–51. 
Musgrave  R  (1966):  Principles  of  budget  determination.  In:  Cameron  H,  Henderson  W  (Eds.): 
Public Finance: Selected Readings. Random House, New York. 
Owoye O (1995): The Causal Relational Between Taxes and Expenditures in the G7 countries: Co-
integration and Error-correction Models. Applied Economics, 2(1):19–22. 
Peacock A, Wiseman J (1961): The Growth of Public Expenditures in the UK. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Phillips  PCB,  Moon  HR  (1999):  Linear  regression  limit  theory  for  nonstationary  panel  data. 
Econometrica, 67:1057–1111. 
Ram R (1988): Additional evidence on causality between government revenues and government 
expenditure. Southern Economic Journal, 617–28. 
Ross KL, Payne JE (1998): A reexamination of budgetary disequilibria. Public Finance Review, 26: 
67–79. 
Thornton  D,  Batten  DS  (1985):  Lag-length  Selection  and  Tests  of G ranger  Causality  between 
Money and Income. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 17:164–178. 